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Increasing Competition in the Petroleum Industry 
by Proscribing Trademark Tying Arrangements 
For over fifty years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
has scrutinized the petroleum industry in the interest of preserv- 
ing and promoting competition. FTC efforts have met with lim- 
ited success, however, since the major integrated oil companies 
have successfully evaded many attacks on specific anticompeti- 
tive practices.' Consequently, over 300 formal investigations into 
alleged deceptive practices have left the structural foundation of 
the petroleum industry basically unchanged.* 
Contemporary concern with the level of competition in the 
oil industry prompted a penetrating new inquiry that revealed the 
compelling market dominance of the largest integrated firms.3 As 
a result, the FTC filed a complaint requesting court-ordered di- 
vestiture of previously integrated operations.' This approach, 
which is designed to restructure the foundation of the industry, 
is an effort to create price competition and correct several anti- 
competitive practices by establishing new, independent firms.5 
Divestiture is not without its problems,~owever, and both the 
FTC and private litigants continue to seek additional ways of 
battling anticompetitive practices of the largest oil companies. 
1. FTC, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1-1 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. For a discussion of the FTC Report, see Comment, 
FTC v. The Petroleum Industry: The Need for Consistent Regulatory Policy, 24 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 761 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FTC v. Petroleum Industry]. 
2. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, a t  1-2. 
3. The inquiry resulted in a published report documenting the dominance of the eight 
largest oil companies at  each level of the industry. The eight largest firms are Texaco, 
Shell, Standard of New Jersey, Standard of Indiana, Gulf, Mobil, Atlantic Richfield, and 
Standard of California. In 1969, these companies controlled 51% of net domestic crude 
production; in 1970,58% of refining capacity and 55% of gasoline marketing. FTC REPORT, 
supra note 1, a t  11-3, -22, -23. The FTC alleges that these companies have restrained 
competition at all levels of the industry and have earned profits in excess of those that 
would have been earned in a competitive market. FTC v.  Petroleum Industry, supra note 
1, a t  766-67. But see Tell, Attacks on the Petroleum Industry: A Rebuttal, 20 ROCKY MTN. 
MIN. L. INST. 91 (1975). 
4 .  See FTC v.  Petroleum Industry, supra note 1, a t  761 n.1. 
5. Id. at  778-79. 
6. Divestiture would probably generate considerable litigation and reorganization 
expenses, eliminate some economies of scale, and require delicate renegotiation of foreign 
marketing arrangements. Additionally, procedural delays and appeals could leave the 
ultimate outcome languishing in the courts for years. Moreover, unless divestiture were 
accompanied by specific regulatory changes and continued emphasis on particular abuses, 
new anticompetitive practices would undoubtedly occur. See FTC v. Petroleum Industry, 
supra note .l, a t  779-82. See genemlly Comment, Attacking Barriers to Entry: An Alterna- 
tive to Divestiture in Antitrust Enforcement, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 311 (1972). 
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One such practice is the arrangement whereby a major oil 
company (major) permits wholesale jobbers or retail dealers to 
sell refined petroleum under the major's commercially attractive 
trademark only if the jobber or dealer agrees to purchase from the 
major refiner all refined products sold under the trademark.' This 
practice has been challenged on the theory that i t  constitutes an 
illegal tying arrangement that restrains commer~e .~  
A tying arrangement, or tie-in, is a stratagem whereby one 
item (the tying device) is sold only on the condition that a sepa- 
rate product (the tied product) also be purchased.' A tie-in can- 
7. See, e.g., Hearings on Marketing Practices in the Gasoline Industry Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 911-13 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Gasoline Inter- 
changeability]. The dealer supply contract of Standard Oil of California provides: 
4. (a) The petroleum products covered by this agreement shall be sold by 
Buyer as the products of Seller and only under the trademarks or brands regu- 
larly used by Seller for such products and Buyer shall not, a t  any time, offer 
for sale under Seller's trademarks or brands, any product not authorized to be 
sold thereunder. 
Id. a t  911. 
8. See Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. fl 75,390, at 98,264 (D. Utah 1974), 
reo'd, 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976); Phillips Petro- 
leum Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) fi 20,716 (FTC 1974). 
Tying arrangements have been proscribed under three federal antitrust statutes: (1) sec- 
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (see Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United 
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)); (2) section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 9 14 
(1970) (see United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd 
per curium, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)); and (3) section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970) (see FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223 (1968)). When the right to use 
a trademark is involved as the alleged tying device, only section 1 of the Sherman Act 
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act may be employed, since the alleged 
tying item is an intangible, to which section 3 of the Clayton Act does not apply. 
Phillips summarizes the provisional acceptance of a consent decree issued by the FTC 
against Phillips Petroleum. The decree is aimed at the exclusive dealing arrangement that 
is enforced by tying the dealer's supply of gasoline to the right to use the Phillips trade- 
mark. Although the decree provides that lessee dealers may be required to protect the 
Phillips trademark and maintain a representative amount of Phillips' trademarked gaso- 
line on their premises, Phillips may not prohibit dealers from selling gasoline purchased 
from non-Phillips sources. In fact, non-Phillips gasoline can even be financed with Phil- 
lips' credit provisions. 
Although the order is not explicit on this point, one commentator has suggested that 
the provision for trademark protection requires the non-Phillips gasoline to conform to 
specifications that assure that the gasoline is the equivalent of trademarked Phillips 
gasoline. Solomon, An Analysis of Tying Arrangements: The Offer You Can't Refuse, 26 
MERCER L. REV. 547, 557 (1975). 
9. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958), the Supreme Court 
defined a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on 
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees 
that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." 
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not be found unless the tying device and the tied product are 
separate and distinct. Here, the tying device is the right to sell 
refined petroleum products under the trademark of a major oil 
company; the tied product is the dealer's or jobber's supply of the 
major's refined petroleum. When a tying arrangement is 
enforced, competition on the merits is curtailed, since the tied 
product rides to market on the coattails of the tying device. Such 
arrangements, according to the Supreme Court, "serve hardly 
any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."1° 
An extensive market analysis into the impact on competition 
normally is not required in order to support an allegation of an 
antitrust violation caused by tying. Rather, the procedure has 
been condensed into a "per se" rule. Under this approach, tie-ins 
are presumed to be illegal when the requisite separateness is es- 
tablished and the arrangement is shown to involve significant 
anticompetitive potential.ll A valid justification for the tie-in, 
however, can provide an affirmative defense. 
Although the Supreme Court has applied the per se test 
where patented and copyrighted items have been used as tying 
devices,12 the Court has not yet examined an alleged tie-in involv- 
ing a trademark. The federal circuit and district courts and the 
FTC, however, have applied the per se test to trademark tie-ins 
with conflicting results. There is no doubt that a license to use a 
trademark can be a tying device,13 but given proper circumstan- 
ces, the requisite separateness or distinctness between the right 
to use the trademark and the tied product may not be present." 
- 
10. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). 
11. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 
(1969); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U S .  1 (1958); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U S .  955 (1972); Warriner Hermetics, 
Inc. v. Copeland Refrig.Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972). 
Traditionally most courts treat the second aspect, significant anticompetitive poten- 
tial, as composite in nature. This characteristic is discussed more thoroughly a t  notes 39 
to 62 and accompanying text infra. 
12. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 334 U S .  131 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 
(1947). 
13. In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U S .  955 (1972), the court found that requiring licensed Chicken Delight franchisees to 
purchase packaging supplies and spice mixes exclusively from the franchisor constituted 
a tying arrangement. See Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 
1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., [1973-1976 
Transfer Binder] TRADE REC. REP. (CCH) fl 20,441 (FTC 1973). 
14. In Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974), the 
court held that the right to do business under the marketing emblem is not a separate 
tying item unless the arrangement involves more than a mere trademark. See Susser v. 
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Thus, the general applicability of the per se tying rule to trade- 
mark tie-ins remains unclear.15 
This comment will analyze the applicability of the per se rule 
and the rule's potential affirmative defenses in the context of 
refined petroleum trademark tie-ins and explore some implica- 
tions of proscribing this marketing method. 
A. Separateness of the Tying Device and the Tied Product1" 
The courts have not clearly defined what constitutes sepa- 
rateness for purposes of tying analysis under the per se test. 
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,17 the Su- 
preme Court's most recent decision involving a tie-in, is not dis- 
positive of the question of separateness. It illustrates, however, 
that even items not traditionally recognized as distinct can be 
treated as separate, particularly when tying the items has an 
anticompetitive impact. In Fortner, the Court held that an 
arrangement whereby credit was provided only on the condition 
that another product also be purchased could constitute an illegal 
tying arrangement .la Similarly, under proper circumstances, a 
Carve1 Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 
U.S. 125 (1965); Mid-American ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell, Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. TI 
74,681, a t  94,982 (D. Ore. 1973) (ICEE trademark and ICEE machine not separate; how- 
ever, tying established on other grounds). 
15. See, e.g., McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with 
Tie-Ins, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1109-16 (1970). 
16. If a marketing arrangement undeniably involves two separate items, the first 
question is whether the items are tied-that is, whether one of the items could not be 
purchased without the other. For instance, in Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 
68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d 
Cir. 1976), the court recognized that several separate items were involved. Therefore, the 
court required the plaintiffs to show that the items were tied-either by coercion or by 
formal agreement. 531 F.2d at  1224. The items are tied in the case of a refined petroleum 
trademark tie-in because the dealer supply contract formally links the right to use the 
trademark to the supply of refined petroleum. See note 7 supra. 
Finding that the right to use the trademark is formally linked to the product assumes, 
however, that the items are separate. This assumption is notalways valid in the field of 
trademarks. Whether the items are separate must be specifically considered. 
17. 394 U.S. 495 (1969). 
18. Id. a t  498. The Fortner decision demonstrates how simple it is to find the required 
separateness. Fortner agreed to purchase overpriced home building materials from a sub- 
sidiary of U.S. Steel in order to obtain the tying device, uniquely attractive financing 
provisions offered by the parent corporation. The dissent reasoned that incidental and 
ancillary selling provisions such as financing arrangements could not be construed to be 
separate tying items. Id. at  510-25 (White & Fortas, JJ., dissenting in separate opinions). 
The majority held, however, that although almost all modern selling involves providing 
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trademark would be considered a separate tying device. 
In modern marketing and manufacturing, trademarks gener- 
ally serve either an identifying or a licensing function. Histori- 
cally, identification has been more widely acknowledged as the 
primary function of a trademark." Thus, in traditional marketing 
and distributing agreements, the trademark is seen as something 
intimately associated with the product before the product reaches 
the marketing outlet, since the emblem identifies the product, its 
source, and its quality. In such situations, the trademark is re- 
garded as inseparable for purposes of tying analysis. 
In contrast, modern chain-style marketing techniques have 
encouraged the development of a new trademark function-the 
licensing function." Licensing is the purpose served by trade- 
marks employed in "rent-a-name" franchise operations, where 
the emblem serves principally as a business opportunity for po- 
tential franchisees attracted by the right to sell under a commer- 
cially valuable emblem. In this situation, it is easier to concep- 
tualize the trademark as a separate device, and courts have gen- 
erally treated it as distinct for tying purposes. 
Even courts that have treated the right to use a trademark 
as a separate item recognize, however, that trademarks histori- 
cally have been considered inherently related to the product they 
identify rather than separate and distinct. Hence, establishing 
the requisite separateness requires that the trademark be found 
to serve more than its traditional purpose.21 For example, in 
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, I ~ c . , ~ ~  the United States Court of Ap- 
peals for the Ninth Circuit found that the Chicken Delight trade- 
mark served primarily as a licensing device for a chain-style busi- 
some incidental services or sales materials, even these incidentals can be separate items, 
particularly where they have an anticompetitive effect. Therefore, U.S. Steel's credit 
provisions were held to be a separate item. Id. at 507-08. 
Fortner may make it easier to consider even those trademarks that serve incidental 
or ancillary purposes as separate and distinct items. See McCarthy, supra note 15, a t  1107- 
09. 
19. See Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 
265 (1975); Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 
363 (1974); Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the 
Market Place, 64 TRADEMARK EP. 75, 87 (1974). 
20. See McCarthy, supm note 15, a t  1112. 
21. See, e.g., Redd. v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054,1057 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43,48-49 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 955 (1972); Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE R C. 
REP. (CCH) n 20,441 (FTC 1973). 
22. 448 F.2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). 
880 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
ness and was not intimately related to the particular products 
sold. In rejecting the defendant's argument that trademarks and 
franchise licenses cannot be separate and distinct items, the court 
looked closely at  the reason for tying the trademark to the prod- 
uct. The court determined that, since the Chicken Delight trade- 
mark was designed to represent goodwill and quality, it could be 
a distinct Therefore, the court held that the right to do 
business under the Chicken Delight name was a separate tying 
device. In reaching its conclusion, the court deemed it important 
that the "sale of a franchise license, with the attendant rights to 
operate a business in the prescribed manner and to benefit from 
the goodwill of the trade name, in no way requires the forced sale 
by the franchisor of some or all of the component articles."24 This 
analysis lends considerable support to the proposition that a 
major oil company trademark is a separate tying device where the 
licensee benefits from the goodwill of the trade name. 
In Redd u. Shell Oil C O . ~ ~  the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite result. Pursuant to the 
sales contract between the parties, Redd, the jobber, was permit- 
ted, but not required, to sell Shell petroleum products under the 
SHELL trademark. Although Shell required Redd to purchase a 
minimum quantity of Shell products, he was not precluded from 
purchasing petroleum from other sources and selling it under a 
different trademark or under no trademark at  The court 
concluded that "the permissive trademark use did not in any way 
transform the mark into a separate product to be sold to the 
 lai in tiff."^' In reaching this conclusion, the court was influenced 
by its observation that Redd was in business for himself, had his 
own bulk stations and trucks, did business as "Abajo Petroleum" 
rather than under Shell's name, and sold products represented to 
be from sources other than Shell. Thus, he did not have a typical 
"franchise," and his use of the SHELL trademark had nothing 
to do with the manner in which he did business.28 The rationale 
for the court's conclusion seems to be that there was no separate 
sale of the SHELL trademark.29 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 49. 
25. 1974-2 Trade Cas. fi 75,390, at 98,264 (D. Utah 1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 1054 (10th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S .  Ct. 1508 (1976). 
26. See 524 F.2d at 1056; 1974-2 Trade Cas. 7 75,390, at 98,265-66. 
27. 524 F.2d at 1057. 
28. Id. at 1056. 
29. There are reasons for treating the refined petroleum trademark as a separate item 
which the Tenth Circuit may have ignored. See notes 30-38 and accompanying text infra. 
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To provide guidance in resolving the conceptual issue of sep- 
arateness, it has been suggested that the inquiry focus on 
"whether the items can be and have been sold separately-that 
is, whether the industry in question treats the items as sepa- 
rate."30 The gasoline marketing arrangement is difficult to clas- 
sify simply by trademark function alone, since it is a hybrid in 
which the major brand emblem serves both an identifying and a 
licensing function. Therefore, an analysis of petroleum industry 
practices is helpful in determining whether the trademark should 
be treated as a separate tying device. 
In traditional marketing arrangements, the product and the 
trademark are treated as inseparable. Soup purchased in a brand 
name can at the supermarket is one example of a traditional 
arrangement-the emblem is part of the packaging itself. Bulk 
transfers of trademarked products can involve similar insepara- 
bility, but this may be more difficult to conceptualize, since each 
product unit is not necessarily packaged in a container bearing 
the marketing emblem. Nevertheless, where a manufacturer con- 
sistently and permanently links the trademark with the product 
before releasing the product into the marketing arena, the right 
to use the trademark and the product itself should be treated as 
one indivisible item. This marketing method has been referred to 
as a typical sale of a trademarked product, or a typical bulk 
transfer. Treating the product and the trademark as inseparable 
assures that the trademark will not be used to sell inferior prod- 
ucts and that purchasers can rely on the quality and uniformity 
of the product. Additionally, it safeguards the trademark owner's 
right to market under the emblem.31 In such a case, the requisite 
separateness cannot be found for purposes of applying the per se 
rule, since the emblem and the product it represents are not sold 
separately. 
30. McCarthy, supra note 15, a t  1108. In Siege1 v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 
43,48 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 US. 955 (1972), the court stated that the following 
factors must be considered: (1) the function of the aggregation; (2) whether cost savings 
result from joint sale; (3) whether the items are normally sold as a unit and in fixed 
proportions; and (4) the function of the trademark. In United States v. Jerrold Elecs. 
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), the lowe: 
court considered the following: (1) whether the items were sold exclusively as a single 
package; (2) whether the composition of each sale had varying proportions of the tying 
and tied items; (3) whether customers were charged for the items separately; and (4) 
whether there was a sound business reason for the combination. 
31. Permitting inferior products or products of inconsistent quality to be marketed 
under the trademark might well constitute a misuse of the legal monopoly conferred upon 
a trademark owner. See Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. 55 1051-1127 (1970); Com- 
ment, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Quality Control]. 
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The marketing of refined petroleum products, however, does 
not involve the same situation, because the supply of products 
and the right to sell under the major brand emblem are frequently 
sold separately by the majors through the use of petroleum ex- 
change agreements. An exchange agreement is a method whereby 
one refiner purchases gasoline from another refiner. Exchanging 
gasoline reduces transportation costs and permits firms lacking 
refining capacity in a certain market area to offer gasoline to their 
branded franchisees in that area.32 Redd v. Shell Oil C O . , ~  for 
example, illustrates the common situation where a jobber or 
dealer receives his supply of gasoline from one company's refinery 
but sells it under another company's trademark.34 The use of 
exchange agreements demonstrates that it is appropriate to con- 
sider the marketing opportunity (trademark) and the refined pe- 
troleum as separate. Selling these two items separately is possible 
because the refined petroleum of one company is essentially inter- 
changeable with the refined petroleum from another company. In 
fact, the majors take advantage of interchangeability until the 
petroleum is ready for sale to the public. As Dr. Albert J. Fritsch 
of the Center for Science in the Public Interest stated, "gasoline 
is treated commercially as a fungible commodity within the pe- 
troleum refining and transport network and then, by a grand 
hocus pocus, becomes a nonfungible product when it reaches the 
 consumer."^ The fungibility of gasoline is further demonstrated 
by the fact that the American Society for Testing Materials issues 
gasoline specifications that are uniformly accepted throughout 
32. See Hearings on Gasoline Interchangeability, supra note 7, at 649-50 (statement 
of Frank H. Staub, Vice President of Marketing, Shell Oil Co.), 891 (statement of D.L. 
Mulit, Vice President of Sales, Standard Oil Co. of California). 
33. 1974-2 Trade Cas. fi 75,390, at 98,265 (D. Utah 1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 1054 (1975), 
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976). 
34. Keith Redd, the plaintiff, alleged that commerce was restrained because he was 
required to purchase his entire supply of gasoline from a Shell refinery, whereas other 
jobbers were able to obtain gasoline from several brands' refineries and sell it under a 
different trademark. Shell refined all the gasoline that was delivered to Redd. Under an 
exchange agreement, however, Shell refined gasoline for Continental Oil Co. and sold it 
to a CONOCO jobber, without the right to use the SHELL trademark, at a reduced price. 
Furthermore, Eugene Hunt, a branded SHELL jobber, received gasoline refined by Amer- 
ican Oil; yet he sold it under the SHELL name. When Redd purchased gasoline from Hunt 
and sold it under the SHELL trademark, Shell Oil terminated Redd's contract. 1974-2 
Trade Cas. fi 75,390, at 98,265-68. 
35. Hearings on Gasoline Interchangeability, supra note 7, at 691-92; see id. at 697 
(statement of Dr. Fritsch), 523 (statement of Maj. Gen. Charles C. Case, Commander, 
Defense Fuel Supply Center). Industry spokesmen, on the other hand, maintain that 
gasoline is not fungible. Id. at 672-75 (written response of Shell Oil Co.), 779-82 (statement 
of Randall Meyer, Vice President, Humble Oil & Refining Co.). 
8751 TRADEMARK TYING ARRANGEMENTS 883 
the petroleum industry and are closely paralleled by federal gov- 
ernment gasoline purchasing  specification^.^^ Gasoline purchased 
by the federal government, for example, must conform with speci- 
fications measured primarily in terms of octane ratings and vola- 
tility classes. The brand, the refinery, and the size of the oil 
company make no difference what~oever;~~ even the presence or 
absence of gasoline additives is disregarded unless it can be estab- 
lished that engine performance might be affected.38 
The use of exchange agreements and the industry's treat- 
ment of refined petroleum as a fungible commodity clearly distin- 
guish bulk petroleum transactions from bulk transfers where the 
manufacturer consistently links the trademark to the product. 
Since refiners do not consistently and permanently link the right 
to use the trademark with the gasoline supply before releasing the 
product into the marketplace, the trademark and the product 
should be treated as separate items for purposes of the per se rule. 
B. Significant Anticompetitive Potential of Tying 
Arrangements 
The proscription of tie-ins is not aimed at the mere coupling 
of two items but at the significant anticompetitive potential re- 
sulting from the economic leverage of the tying device. In early 
decisions, the Supreme Court's test of significant anticompetitive 
potential was based on the market dominance of the firm impos- 
ing the tie.39 Market dominance, however, is difficult for the 
36. Id. at  521, 529 (statement of Maj. Gen. Charles C. Case, Commander, Defense 
Fuel Supply Center). 
37. Id. at 538-45 (Fed. Spec. W-G-76B, March 20, 1970). 
38. Id. at 520-30. There is considerable controversy about the usefulness of additives 
and their effect on the interchangeability of gasolines. Under present marketing arrange- 
ments, essentially similar additives are available as shelf items to all refiners. Id. at  768- 
69 (testimony of A.J. Williams, Vice President, Dow Chemical Co.). Furthermore, addi- 
tives are frequently dispensed by sophisticated equipment into several different brands 
at a common location such as a bulk plant or the terminus of a pipeline. Id. at  637-38 
(testimony of D.W. Calvert, Executive Vice President, Williams Co.). This suggests that 
the additive package desired in a particular brand of gasoline could be added to the 
gasoline without tying the supply of gasoline to the right to use the trademark. Therefore, 
even if a dealer or jobber obtained his gasoline from a source other than the company 
whose trademark he displays, he could still obtain the additive package advertised in 
connection with the trademark under which he markets gasoline. Although it  may be 
impractical for individual dealers to mix additives at  their stations, id. at 651 (statement 
of Frank H. Staub, Vice President of Marketing, Shell Oil Co.), satisfactory alternative 
methods are available. 
39. See FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463,474 (1923); United Shoe Mach. Corp. 
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1922). 
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plaintiff to establish.'O Accordingly, more recent Supreme Court 
decisions have rejected the need to show market dominance and 
have adopted the following criteria in determining whether the 
anticompetitive potential is significant enough to establish an 
antitrust violation: (1) the tying arrangement must involve 
"sufficient economic power to appreciably restrain free competi- 
tion" in the market for the tied product; and (2) a "not insubstan- 
tial amount of interstate commerce" must be affected by the 
arrangement. 
1.  Sufficient economic power 
a. Market influence. One factor that may be determinative 
of whether "sufficient economic power" exists is the market influ- 
ence of the firm imposing the tie. The seller's market influence 
can be demonstrated by the seller's ability to impose price in- 
creases, other burdensome terms, or merely the tie-in itself on an 
appreciable number of buyers.42 The market influence of the 
major integrated oil companies over dealers and jobbers is mani- 
fested by the thousands of dealers and jobbers throughout the 
nation who are locked into these tying contracts.43 As the Su- 
preme Court noted in Northern Pacific Railway v. United 
States, 44 ''the very existence of this host of tying arrangements is 
40. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
41. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 , 6  (1958); Fortner Enterprises, 
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-04 (1969). 
Although in recent decisions the Sherman Act test of anticompetitive potential has 
been described as two-pronged, arguably one prong would suffice. When a tying arrange- 
ment involves sufficient economic power to "appreciably" restrain free competition, the 
volume of commerce required by the second prong is almost certainly satisfied. The 
Supreme Court appears to have recognized this by minimizing the importance of the 
second prong. For example, in Fortner, the Court held that the second prong is satisfied 
so long as the amount of commerce is not de minimus. Moreover, under section 3 of the 
Clayton Act, a per se violation exists even if only one prong of the test is met. See Times- 
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 607-09 (1953). 
For convenience, this comment employs the traditional bifurcated Sherman Act anal- 
ysis. But the intent of the courts could be preserved and analysis simplified if the Sherman 
Act test and the Clayton Act test were harmonized and the per se rule were rephrased. A 
tying arrangement should be per se illegal if there is a separate tying device and a tied 
product and the arrangement has the potential to significantly restrain interstate com- 
merce. 
42. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 
(1969). 
43. In Redd v. Shell Oil Co., for example, the alleged tie-in was part of a standard- 
form contract imposed on over 800 Shell jobbers and retailers located throughout the 
nation. Brief for Appellee a t  42, Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976). 
44. 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958). 
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itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power." 
The inequality between the bargaining positions of the major 
oil company and the jobber or retailer further demonstrates the 
market influence of the seller. As one circuit judge has com- 
mented: 
The inherent leverage a major oil company has over its dealers 
results from the market structure of the industry and the special 
dependence on the company of the service station dealer (who 
is usually also a lessee). . . . A man operating a gas station is 
bound to be overawed by the great corporation that is his sup- 
plier, his banker, and his landlord.45 
Jobbers and retailers are simply unable to bargain for anything 
but a tie-in if the major chooses to impose it. 
Although refiners often expressly disclaim in their contracts 
any control over jobbers and station operators, such contract lan- 
guage is frequently not observed in practi~e.'~ Refiners often dic- 
tate hours, location, station appearance, product source, and 
credit card policy. They also manipulate price and sales territory 
through bulk hauling rates and temporary market al lowan~es.~ 
b. Inherent power. Alternatively, the sufficient economic 
power requirement can be satisfied by showing that the tying 
device itself has "inherent power" to appreciably restrain com- 
mer~e. '~  The inherent power of the tying device can be demon- 
strated by its desirability to buyers." This desirability is clearly 
evidenced when the tied product commands a higher wholesale 
or retail price than if it were sold separately. 
Major brand petroleum trademarks possess this quality. By 
sponsoring nationwide advertising and encouraging motorists to 
purchase gasoline on credit, the majors induce consumers to pay 
a higher price for branded gasoline. This, in turn, permits the 
majors to charge dealers and jobbers more for gasoline tied to the 
trademark." The increased price is thought by some to signifi- 
- 
45. Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). 
46. Solomon, supra note 8, a t  549. 
47. See Brief for Appellee at 13-17, Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976) (discussing Shell's delivery and territorial 
restrictions). 
48. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 
(1969); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). 
49. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 
(1969). 
50. See, e.g., Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 1[ 75,390, at 98,266-67 (D. Utah 
1974), reo'd, 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976); Hearings 
on Problems of Small Business in Gasoline Marketing Before the Subcomm. on Activities 
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cantly exceed the price that is justified by the cost of advertising, 
credit, and other services provided by majors to dealer-jobber 
 network^.^' 
The inherent power of the tying device is also demonstrated 
where the uniqueness of the tying item prevents competitors from 
also offering the item. Uniqueness may be legal, physical, or eco- 
no mi^.^^ For instance, in the field of patents and copyrights, the 
Supreme Court has held that the very existence of a tying device 
that is protected by a patent or copyright gives rise to the eco- 
nomic power needed to make a tying arrangement illegal.53 Al- 
though there are differences between copyrights, patents, and 
trader nark^,^^ the major brand petroleum trademark enjoys a 
legal distinctiveness analogous to the uniqueness of patents and 
copyrights. The emblem is saturated with commercial magnetism 
and legal uniqueness, particularly in light of the market influence 
the major refiners exercise over buyers. Moreover, the impact of 
using a trademark to exclude competition is precisely the same 
as the impact of using a patent or copyright." Thus, in the con- 
text of major brand refined petroleum marketing, there is "no 
reason why the presumption that exists in the case of the patent 
and copyright does not equally apply to the trade-mark."56 
2. Not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce 
Traditionally, the second determinant of significant anti- 
competitive potential is whether the tying arrangement involves 
a "not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce."57 The re- 
of Regulatory Agencies Relating to Small Business of the House Select Comm. on Small 
Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (testimony of Lloyd M. Sutherland, President, Suther- 
land Oil Co.), 30 (testimony of T.A. Harrell, Jr., Mobil jobber), 38-39 (submission of 
Harrison F. Houghton, economic consultant) (1972) [hereinafter cited as Small Business 
Hearings]. 
51. E.g., Small Business Hearings, supra note 50, at 31 (testimony of T.A. Harrell, 
Jr., Mobil jobber), 38-39 (submission of Harrison F. Houghton, economic consultant). 
52. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,503, 505 n.2 
(1969). 
53. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 46 (1962); United States v. Para- 
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,157-59 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United States, 
332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947). 
54. Lunsford, supra note 19, a t  79. 
55. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 955 (1972). See also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
56. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 955 (1972). 
57. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969). 
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quirements for this determinant were summarized in Fortner, 
where the Supreme Court stated that "the controlling considera- 
tion is simply whether a total amount of business, substantial 
enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de 
minimus, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie . . . ."58 The 
relevant figure is the volume of sales tied by the sales policy under 
~hallenge.~' Even relatively small sums have been held significant 
enough to qualify.'O 
The required "not insubstantial" amount of interstate com- 
merce can readily be demonstrated in gasoline marketing ar- 
rangements? Although the market share controlled by any major 
firm may never amount to traditional "market d~minance," '~ as 
applied by the courts, the per se rule is not dependent on market 
dominance but only on the absolute dollar amount of commerce 
subject to restraint. The dollar amount can be determined by 
considering sales to the plaintiff or the aggregate volume of com- 
merce tied by the defendant's policy. Consequently, it is difficult 
to imagine a refined petroleum tie-in that would not involve suffi- 
cient interstate commerce. Even sales to an individual station 
operator would probably not be insubstantial or de minimus, 
particularly if the tie-in had existed for several years. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. a t  502. 
60. The Court stated in Fortner, "[Wle cannot agree . . . that a sum of almost 
$200,000 is paltry or 'insubstantial'." Id. 
61. During the few years that Keith Redd served as a branded Shell jobber, he 
purchased over $3,000,000 worth of refined petroleum products, including over $500,000 
worth of gasoline. Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. fi 75,390, a t  98,269 (D. Utah 
1974), reu'd, 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976). 
With respect to the requirement that the commerce be interstate, there usually can 
be little doubt that the major oil companies are engaged in interstate commerce. Even 
when there is doubt, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to find interstate commerce 
on a very tenuous connection. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314- 
15 (1949). 
62. The FTC Report identified the largest individual market share of any one of the 
major firms as 8.13%. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, a t  11-23. Senator Hart, however, pointed 
out that these national figures are somewhat misleading. 
Texaco is the only company which even tries to market in all 50 States. Most 
of the rest tend to concentrate, in greater or lesser degree, in particular market- 
ing areas. 
This makes their importance in individual markets far greater than na- 
tional figures would indicate. 
Hearings on Competition in the Petroleum Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust 
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973) 
(introductory remarks by Senator Phillip Hart, Chairman). 
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C. Potential Justifications for Tying Arrangements 
Even if it is shown that a tying arrangement exists, an af- 
firmative defense can be established by demonstrating the pres- 
ence of a legitimate business purpose63 and the absence of a less 
restrictive and commercially feasible a l t e rna t i~e .~~  
1. Legitimate business purpose 
A legitimate business purpose for a tie-in can be demon- 
strated by evidence that business goodwill or product quality 
would be threatened absent the res t r ic t i~n.~~ Legitimate business 
purposes, however, generally depend upon current and transitory 
market considerations. Thus, a defendant's justification may 
be eliminated by technological breakthroughs or economic 
changes? One legitimate business purpose served by the petro- 
leum trademark tying arrangement is the interest in maintaining 
business goodwill by assuring reliable sources of supply. Tying 
arrangements can assure retailers and jobbers a continuity of 
source, which helps establish and preserve the goodwill of the 
clientele." A second major interest that can be protected by the 
petroleum trademark tie-in is product quality. Binding the job- 
-- -- - -- 
63. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
405 U S .  955 (1972) (Chicken Delight asserted that its arrangement was necessary to 
assure quality control); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (Jerrold Electronics maintained that new 
firms struggling to capture a share of a market deserved freedom from the tie-in proscrip- 
tion). 
64. In discussing defenses to a tying claim, a federal district court, in Ungar v. 
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., said: "The general principle which has emerged, . . . 
is that a restraint of trade can be justified only in the absence of less restrictive alterna- 
tives. . . ." 68 F.R.D. 65, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 531 
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976) (suitability of class action challenge to illegal tie-in). In Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949), the Supreme Court concluded that 
"[tlhe only situation, indeed, in which the protection of good will may necessitate the 
use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so detailed that they 
could not practically be supplied." For a discussion of the defenses to a tying claim, see 
McCarthy, supra note 15, a t  1110-16. 
65. See McCarthy, supra note 15, a t  1110-11. 
66. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-08 (1949). 
For instance, the "newcomer" justification, see note 63 supra, would probably not 
apply to established major brand refiners even though it may be asserted to protect new 
independent refiners and small integrated firms. In United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 
187 F. Supp. 545, 557-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U S .  567 (1961), the trial 
court concluded that, while the tie-in was reasonable a t  the time of its inception, it later 
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
67. In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847,850-51 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd 
and remanded on other grounds, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 
(l972), the trial court rejected the argument that tying was necessary to assure a continu- 
ing source of essential items. 
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bers and dealers to brand name refiners vests in the trademark 
owner the ability to control quality, regardless of whether the 
gasoline is acquired under an exchange agreement or directly 
from the trademark owner? When the trademark owner makes 
all the decisions about the quality of the product, he is naturally 
more willing to assume ultimate responsibility for any damage 
that results from dispensing an inferior product.6g Without the 
petroleum trademark tie-in, the refiner would necessarily release 
some of his power to control quality. I t  has also been suggested 
that a secure, profitable market encourages research and develop- 
ment-without the expectation of selling gasoline under a tied 
trademark, petroleum technology, especially important in light of 
modern demands for energy, would lose its priority among indus- 
try  objective^.^^ 
2. Commercially feasible and less anticompetitive alternatives 
Although there are at  least two legitimate business purposes 
for the refined petroleum trademark tie-in, an antitrust violation 
might be shown to exist since each business purpose can be satis- 
fied by a less restrictive alternative arrangement. For example, 
one alternative that assures reliable market outlets and sources 
of supply is to allow dealers and jobbers to negotiate requirements 
contracts with their gasoline  supplier^.^^ Requirements contracts 
negotiated for a reasonable term would allow competitive forces 
-- pp 
68. See Hearings on Gasoline Interchangeability, supra note 7, a t  654-55 (statement 
of Frank H. Staub, Vice President of Marketing, Shell Oil Co.), 893 (statement of D.L. 
Mulit, Vice President of Sales, Standard Oil Co. of California). "Regarding the aspect of 
quality control of gasoline received on exchange or purchased, . . . we are careful to 
exercise continuing quality control to assure that such gasoline meets our product stan- 
dards, including such important factors as octane, volatility, vapor pressure, stability, 
lead content, and uniformity of quality." Id. at  893. 
69. Interview with William Simon, counsel for Shell in Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 
1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976), in Washington, D.C., September 
18, 1975. 
70. Hearings on Gasoline Interchangeability, supra note 7, a t  654-55 (statement of 
Frank H. Staub, Vice President of Marketing, Shell Oil Co.). 
71. The Supreme Court recognized the advantages of reasonable requirements con- 
tracts in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949): 
hquirements contracts . . . may well be of economic advantage to buyers as 
well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to  the consuming public. In 
the case of the buyer, they may assure supply, afford protection against rises in 
price, enable long-term planning on the basis of known costs, and obviate the 
expense and risk of storage in the quantity necessary for a commodity having a 
fluctuating demand. 
Id. 
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to operate as the contracts expire, while permitting dealers, job- 
bers, and refiners to project with reasonable certainty the quan- 
tity of gasoline necessary to satisfy the market. 
The legitimate interest in protecting product quality can be 
adequately safeguarded by providing specifications to competi- 
tors so that conforming products can be purchased from alterna- 
tive sources.72 This alternative has been required by courts pro- 
scribing other tying arrangements unless the defendant can prove 
that specifications could not be practicably supplied or effec- 
tively policed.73 Since gasoline specifications are already fur- 
nished by refiners involved in exchange agreements," this alter- 
native appears to be a satisfactory method of protecting quality. 
Each of these alternative arrangements would have less anti- 
competitive effect than trademark tie-ins. Competition would be 
increased by allowing retailers and jobbers to enter into require- 
ments contracts with competing refiners who market conforming 
gasoline and by requiring the major brand refiners to exchange 
their specifications in order to make available conforming alter- 
native sources of supply.75 Dealers and jobbers would then con- 
tinue to bind themselves to single suppliers only if it were 
72. See, e.g, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); Siegel v. 
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43,51-52 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). 
For instance, although the McDonald's Corporation trademark attaches at the point of 
consumer sale to all products sold by individual franchises, McDonald's itself sells none 
of the ingredients to franchisees. Rather, ingredients conforming to McDonald's specifica- 
tions are obtained locally by the franchisees. See Hearings on the Role of Small Business 
in Franchising Before the Subcomrn. on Minority Small Business Enterprise and Fran- 
chising of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
52 (1973) (testimony of Norman Axelrad, Vice President, Public Affairs, McDonald's 
Corp.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Franchising]. 
73. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). There are, of course, 
cases where some extraordinary condition forecloses the exchanging of specifications. For 
example, it would be impractical where product quality is measured subjectively. See 
Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REC. REP. (CCH) fl 20,441, 
at 20,346 (FTC 1973). Furthermore, specifications would not be required where they would 
reveal a trade secret. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 n.9 (9th Cir. 
19711, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). 
74. See, e.g., Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. fl 75,390, at 98,268 (D. Utah 
1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976); Hearings 
on Gasoline Interchangeability, supra note 7, a t  893 (statement of D.L. Mulit, Vice Presi- 
dent of Sales, Standard Oil Co. of California). 
75. One potential problem remains. It has been observed that direct quality control 
over products supplied by other petroleum companies may tend to restrict competition. 
If constant, extensive interrelationships between actual and potential competitors are 
required, the resulting interdependence may induce and camouflage other forms of anti- 
competitive combination. Quality Control, supra note 31, a t  1191. This hazard must be 
controlled as courts select alternatives to tying arrangements. 
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economically advantageou~;~~ thus, the refiners would be required 
to compete for the continued patronage of the buyers rather than 
being able to dictate price terms unilaterally. 
Although some costs may be incurred in policing the quality 
of gasoline purchased from other refiners, both of the above alter- 
natives appear to be commercially feasible. First, since the re- 
quirements contracts alternative merely involves substituting one ' 
contract for another, there should be no significant increase in 
cost. Second, whatever additional expense might be incurred in 
supplying specifications and establishing a follow-up system of 
quality control," present gasoline marketing techniques suggest 
that quality can be effectively policed without substantial cost.78 
For instance, specifications currently are traded under exchange 
agreements, and methods already exist for inspecting gasoline at 
refineries, bulk plants, and retail stations. Moreover, experience 
in other industries confirms that quality control frequently can be 
accomplished simply by setting standards and periodically in- 
specting samples .79 
Forecasting the implications of proscribing tying arrange- 
ments necessarily involves some speculation. Thus, potential ef- 
fects must be stated as possibilities or, at best, probabilities. It 
appears, however, that eliminating petroleum trademark tie-ins 
76. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 313-14 (1949). 
77. Interview with William Simon, supra note 69; see, e.g., Hearings on Gasoline 
Interchangeability, supra note 7, a t  898-900 (statement of D.L. Mulit, Vice President of 
Sales, Standard Oil Co. of California). 
78. The commercial feasibility and cost of quality control should not be analyzed in 
terms of the relative cost of the "specification" alternative compared with the economic 
injury from the present method of doing business. Rather; the cost of supplying specifica- 
tions, that is, whether the alternative would require a prohibitive expenditure, should be 
the deciding factor. This method obviates the need for a complicated analysis of the tying 
arrangement's effect on competition and recognizes that tie-ins are proscribed for their 
anticompetitive potential, not their proven impact. Similarly, by concentrating on cost, 
the burden of proving infeasibility remains on the defendant, and the inquiry centers on 
the defendant's own cost structure. Relatively simple calculations provide the court with 
the relevant data, including the price increase necessary to absorb the expense of quality 
control. See 84 HARV. L  REV. 1717, 1723-24 (1971). 
79. See, e.g., Hearings on Franchising, supra note 72, a t  52 (testimony of Norman 
Axelrad, Vice President, Public Affairs, McDonald's Corporation). Other possible meth- 
ods of quality control include "plant supervision, inspection, training of the licensee's 
employees, approval of the licensee's advertising, requiring the licensee to refund the 
dissatisfied purchasers, and cancellation of license provisions." Quality Control, supra 
note 31, a t  1177. 
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would increase competition in the marketing of gasoline without 
jeopardizing the legitimate interests of consumers, dealers, job- 
bers, and integrated majors. Consumers would probably notice 
few changes other than reduced prices; credit card acceptance 
and product quality probably would not change. Dealers and job- 
bers would acquire a greater responsibility to negotiate for lower 
priced gasoline.80 Since the focal point of competition would be 
price, branded dealers would no longer be limited to competition 
through secondary marketing techniques such as location, 
service, giveaways, and the image created by national advertis- 
ing. A greater premium would be placed on ability to negotiate 
the most advantageous price with the majors; therefore, marginal 
dealers and jobbers might be eliminated.81 
From the perspective of the integrated majors, eliminating 
trademark tie-ins would increase direct competition with respect 
to the sale of petroleum products and place more emphasis on 
franchise marketing techniques. Since sales of the tied product 
would no longer provide compensation for the use of the trade- 
mark,82 the majors would have to develop other methods of at- 
taining a return for the use of their trademark name. Feasible 
alternative methods of compensation include charging franchise 
fees or royalties calculated as a percentage of total sales under the 
trademark, regardless of the actual source of the petroleum prod- 
u c t ~ . ~ ~  
The integrated majors also may attempt to expand their 
marketing of brand name refined petroleum through company- 
80. Certainly many jobbers and dealers would find it convenient to continue purchas- 
ing both trademark rights and refined petroleum products from the same source. These 
jobbers and dealers could be enticed by legitimate price reductions resulting from selling 
a package of services along with the supply of refined petroleum. For instance, price 
reductions could result from consolidating quality control procedures and streamlining 
accounting operations. Neither the trademark license nor the refined petroleum, however, 
could be offered a t  artificially low prices to induce purchases of both items as a package. 
See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 54-55 (1962). 
81. Faced with the new emphasis on ability to negotiate such sales contracts, dealers 
and jobbers might react by organizing associations designed to provide expertise and 
advice in dealing with the major petroleum companies. 
82. This is not to say, however, that the majors would be unable to make a profit on 
the sale of petroleum products. This would eliminate only the portion of profits on sales 
of petroleum products that were designed to compensate for the use of the trademark. 
83. Royalties based on sales could be measured either from required accounting state- 
ments or meter readings on gasoline pumps. Linking franchise fees to sales would encour- 
age majors to  continue to provide a package of marketing services complementing the 
right to sell under the trademark, thereby promoting the interests of the refiners, dealers, 
and jobbers. 
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owned stations.84 Fortunately, the anticompetitive impact of this 
alternative has been observed by Congress. The Senate of the 
94th Congress unanimously approved a bill checking further ex- 
pansion into marketing by the integrated majors, and the House 
of Representatives considered several similar measures.85 Without 
such protection, increased direct retail marketing would probable 
weed out jobbers and retailers who attempt to shop for their 
supply of refined petroleum. 
Faced with price competition and less opportunity to reap 
excess profits, the major oil companies may choose to divest 
themselves of stations not selling their brand name products. 
Small businessmen would probably be unable to purchase these 
stations, thereby creating a void that might be filled by gasoline 
marketing chainsY Although the majors have threatened such 
action, large-scale abandonment of retail marketing outlets 
seems unnecessary. The commercial desirability of the nationally 
advertised brand, coupled with effective quality control, should 
permit the majors to earn a reasonable return by charging their 
branded dealers for credit card programs and other marketing 
services and by collecting royalties or franchise fees." 
Proscribing petroleum trademark tying might have an im- 
84. See Hearings on Gasoline Interchangeability, supra note 7, a t  651-53 (statement 
of Frank H. Staub, Vice President of Marketing, Shell Oil Co.), 896-900 (statement of D.L. 
Mulit, Vice President of Sales, Standard Oil Co. of California). 
85. The United States Senate unanimously approved S. 323, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1975) (Fair Marketing of Petroleum Products Act) on June 20, 1975. The bill would have 
enforced a moratorium on major market shareholder expansion in gasoline marketing. It 
provided in pertinent part that a major market shareholder could not 
commence the operation of any distributorship or retail establishment the per- 
sonnel of which are under the control of such person or under the control of an 
entity controlled by such a person if . . . the total number of such person's 
distributorships and retail establishments would be larger than the largest frac- 
tion computed for any major market shareholder . . . during the five years 
preceding April 1, 1975. 
121 CONG. REC. S 11111 (1975). The bill, however, was never enacted. 
During the 1st Session of the 94th Congress, the following bills, entitled "Fair Market- 
ing of Petroleum Products Act," were introduced and referred to the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: H.R. 6266, H.R. 6385, H.R. 7529, H.R. 7530, H.R. 
9392, and H.R. 10070. Each included provisions substantially similar to S. 323, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), quoted supra, and like S. 323 each died in committee. 
86. Loss of the small, independent businessmen would reduce competition at the 
retail level. Moreover, the major oil companies allege that if these stations were put up 
for sale, promising business opportunities for minorities would evaporate. See Hearings 
on Gasoline Interchangeability, supra note 7, a t  651-53 (statement of Frank H. Staub, Vice 
President of Marketing, Shell Oil Co.), 896-900 (statement of D.L. Mulit, Vice President 
of Sales, Standard Oil Co. of California). 
87. See note 83 and accompanying text supra. 
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pact on parties other than those directly affected by the arrange- 
ments. For example, with jobbers and dealers free to purchase 
any conforming gasoline, independent refiners might be induced 
to expand refining capacity and offer additional gasoline con- 
forming to industry specifications. Because this would augment 
the range of potential suppliers, competition might be further 
increased 
Court-ordered divestiture of refining and marketing facilities 
may eventually be required, but for the present, eliminating 
trademark tying would be a significant victory. 
88. Arguably, genuine price competition at both the marketing and refining levels 
might unleash backward competitive pressure on the crude oil market, particularly if such 
competition is supplemented with increased energy efficiency and the development of 
alternate energy sources. 
